Spy organizations have a long history of utilizing open outlets to convey secret messages, for example, station numbers or mysterious arranged advertisements. Presently, be that as it may, they’ve adjusted to the web period.
Both the New York Times and the Intercept have discovered that the NSA utilized Twitter to send “about twelve” coded messages to a Russian contact guaranteeing to have office information stolen by the Shadow Intermediaries.
It’s obscure how basic this training is, both on other informal communities and from different offices. This gives intelligence agencies a chance to arrange stealthy interchanges with little exertion, and no chance of knowing the real meaning of the message.
The NSA paid about $100,000 to the Russian with expectations of recuperating a Shadow Broker’s information, yet removed the arrangement when he rather displayed data guaranteeing to connect President Trump and partners to Russia. Just some of that data was unquestionable, and the NSA was apparently concerned this could be a piece of a Russian government crusade to sow confusion in the American organization.